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INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA:  
LOCATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIETAC IN THE CONTEXT OF  
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC FACTORS 
Jeff Miller* 
Introduction 
Since the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) initiated market-based 
economic reforms in 1978, the country has become increasingly integrated into the 
global economy. An inexpensive yet reasonably well-educated labour force, favour-
able regulatory and monetary policy, and a burgeoning middle class have 
transformed China into an attractive destination for foreign capital and commer-
cial expansion. This has necessitated the development of legal mechanisms to 
protect the obligations and rights that are inherent in all transactions occurring in 
the context of a modern capitalist system. Of particular importance has been the 
creation of institutions designed to mitigate the tangible and perceived risks facing 
foreign businesses operating in the PRC. Having been formed in 1956, the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) has been 
repurposed to fulfill this role, in part. 
CIETAC is a neutral arbitration mechanism for the settlement of commercial 
disputes arising from interactions between foreign and domestic Chinese business-
es. Its operations are informed by both domestic and international law and it is 
nominally independent of the state, existing under the framework of the China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade (also known as the China 
Chamber of International Commerce), a non-governmental organization.1 
Through multiple revisions to its constating rules since its inception, it has been 
adapted to service the requirements of a transforming Chinese economy for a sta-
ble and predictable means of dispute resolution. In contrast to the Chinese court 
system, which is widely regarded as fragmented and inconsistent, CIETAC is an 
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avenue that is insulated from the immediate political and economic pressures that 
undercut the effectiveness of the judiciary.2 
Over time, CIETAC has assumed a more international character, adopting the 
predominant norms and practices for international commercial arbitration es-
poused by established entities such as the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC). As will be demonstrated, CIETAC has gradually incorporated core 
values and practices of these systems relating to administrative decentralization, 
party autonomy, and procedural transparency. The alignment of CIETAC with 
internationally accepted standards has served as evidence that the organization has 
moved beyond its Maoist-era roots and has accepted the Western liberal ethics of 
fairness and due process. 
However, despite significant realignment of the substantive elements of the 
CIETAC Arbitration Rules, the organization remains an artifact of its cultural con-
text. CIETAC is typified by a unique approach to international commercial 
arbitration that fuses Western notions of party autonomy with the Chinese impera-
tives of harmony and efficiency. As this paper will argue, the evolution of CIETAC 
in this manner has been a deliberate response to the often-conflicting pressures 
exerted by international and domestic forces. Rather than converging completely 
with established international arbitration norms, CIETAC’s development has been 
affected by two trends in the PRC’s reform trajectory. 
The first trend is the balanced integration of China into the global economic 
order. The “peaceful rise” foreign policy doctrine espoused by Presidents Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao postulates China as seeking accommodation within existing 
global institutions. This accommodation is not exclusively mono-directional; both 
the country and the institution are mutually constituted. Therefore, while China 
has sought to assimilate large portions of current institutional practice in the field 
of international arbitration, it has retained certain culturally specific elements that 
allow it to project a measure of influence in how international commercial arbitra-
tions are undertaken. 
The second trend is the incrementalism that has characterized the PRC’s do-
mestic economic reform. Historical development of CIETAC has been 
incremental, corresponding with the PRC’s measured transition to a market econ-
omy. This has been done to both protect and enhance the development of the 
PRC’s domestic economic capacity.  
This evolutionary trajectory has endowed CIETAC with particular characteris-
tics that distinguish it from other international commercial arbitration bodies. This 
paper will evaluate four of these elements. The first is institutional centrality. Un-
like the frameworks provided by UNCITRAL or the ICC, CIETAC’s has a rigid 
organizational form. The CIETAC secretariat retains the ability to influence the 
outcome of individual tribunals and the CIETAC Arbitration Rules stipulate  
compulsory administrative provisions that arbitrating parties cannot mutually 
agree to displace. Second, the CIETAC Arbitration Rules contain a provision al-
lowing mediation-arbitration, otherwise known as med-arb. This is both a 
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reflection of the legal culture of China as well as an imperative to maximize effi-
ciency in the CIETAC arbitration process. Third, the resolution of disputes in a 
manner that is efficient and restorative of the relationship between the parties is the 
overarching value of the CIETAC arbitration framework. Though protections exist 
for party autonomy, these are balanced against this principal objective. Fourth, the 
convergence of CIETAC’s origins in Chinese civil law with the centralized struc-
ture of the institution has given tribunals a high degree of inquisitorial authority. 
This is in contrast to the purely adversarial method deployed by most international 
arbitration institutions.  
Before evaluating the constitutive factors of CIETAC’s evolution and its distin-
guishing factors, however, this paper will commence with an overview of the 
organization’s historical development and a brief discussion of the economic and 
legal cultures of contemporary China. 
Historical development and legal background of CIETAC 
With its origins in 1956, during the heady days of Maoist China, CIETAC has 
evolved considerably from an organization designed to settle trade disputes in a 
communist command economy to a modern example of an effective international 
commercial arbitration institution. As an institution created in the context of a 
socialist economy, CIETAC’s organizational character retains certain features that 
reflect the predominant practices of that era, such as the organization’s high degree 
of centralization. However, in order to remain relevant to the PRC’s transitioning 
economy and to respond to international pressures, CIETAC’s guiding rules have 
undergone seven revisions since 1978.  
The first major reform occurred in 1989 and entailed the replacement of the 
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (as CIETAC was known formerly) Rules 
with the CIETAC Arbitration Rules3 that were premised on the UNCITRAL Arbi-
tration Rules.4 The most significant change arising from this revision was in regard 
to the composition of the CIETAC Panel of Arbitrators. The CIETAC Panel of 
Arbitrators is the prescribed list of arbitrators that parties to CIETAC arbitrations 
must select from. Prior to 1989, all members of this panel were PRC citizens. To 
facilitate the internationalization of the organization, membership was broadened 
in 1989 to encompass individuals of other nationalities. This revision had two no-
table effects. First, Fishburne and Lian note that this change enhanced the 
confidence of foreign businesses in CIETAC and contributed to the considerable 
increase in its caseload during the late 1980s and early 1990s.5 The presence of arbi-
trators of non-Chinese nationalities reduced the outward appearance of bias that 
had afflicted CIETAC in years prior. Second, it enhanced the development of 
CIETAC and its integration into the global mainstream. The participation of arbi-
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trators of differing nationalities served as a mechanism by which new norms could 
be introduced into the body and organizational learning could be facilitated.  
The reform trajectory established by the 1989 revision was continued in both 
1992 and 1995 as CIETAC assimilated further norms and practices from estab-
lished international arbitration bodies, such as the ICC and UNCITRAL.6 In 1994, 
modifications were also made to the PRC’s domestic law in order to clarify the en-
forceability of CIETAC decisions in China and to provide a more robust avenue for 
the appeal of awards made by CIETAC and domestically oriented arbitrations bod-
ies.7 These alterations were advanced in the 1994 Arbitration Law.8 The law 
provided for a unified articulation of PRC law as it applies to both domestic arbi-
trations and foreign arbitrations. It also resolved discrepancies between the 
CIETAC Arbitration Rules and the 1991 Law on Civil Procedure of the People’s 
Republic of China by providing for a separate legal mechanism to govern the ap-
propriate conduct of arbitrations in China. However, one of the most significant 
and controversial implications of the Arbitration Law on CIETAC has been the 
“virtual monopoly” that it grants to it with respect to international commercial 
arbitrations involving a party domiciled in the PRC.9 
Article 6 of the Arbitration Law codifies that all arbitration agreements must 
specify a commission to oversee the arbitration process in order to be valid and 
enforceable in China.10 This prevents the application of ad hoc arbitration proce-
dures to international arbitration proceedings in China, which occur outside of the 
administration of CIETAC. Ad hoc rules can be adopted within the CIETAC 
framework, but the validity of doing so is questionable in the context of Chinese 
law, as will be discussed shortly. While parties are able to specify a commission 
separate from CIETAC to govern the proceedings, this practice is rare as there is 
uncertainty over the extent to which an award granted by an external commission 
would be upheld by the PRC’s courts. Though China is a party to organizations 
such as the ICC and agreements such as the New York Convention,11 the courts 
have been ambiguous in the way that they apply these international structures in 
domestic law.12 For instance, while the New York Convention specifies that domes-
tic courts may only review foreign arbitral decisions for fairness, Article 58 of the 
Arbitration Law broadens this by allowing the courts to review awards for compli-
ance with domestic arbitration standards and public policy.13 It has been noted that 
                                                                                                                                                         
6 Ibid at 304.  
7 Ibid at 304.  
8 Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China, Standing Committee of the National People’s Con-
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9 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Resolving Disputes in China Through Arbitration (Hong Kong, 2007) 
at 12. 
10 Arbitration, supra note 8 at Article 6:  
The arbitration commission shall be selected by the parties through agreement. 
11 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7 June 1959, 330 UNTS 3.  
12 Freshfields, supra note 9 at 12. 
13 Arbitration, supra note 8 at Article 58:  
 A party may apply for setting aside an arbitration award to the intermediate peoples court in 
the place where the arbitration commission is located if he can produce evidence which proves that the 
arbitration award involves one of the following circumstances;  
(1) There is no arbitration agreement;  
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these exemptions have been liberally applied by Chinese courts, in contrast to the 
restrictive approach commonly taken by courts in other jurisdictions, particularly 
with regard to the public policy exemption.14 Moreover, there is an absence of leg-
islated mechanisms to allow for the enforcement of external awards in China. For 
example, despite becoming a member of the ICC in 1994, Beijing has yet to estab-
lish a framework for the enforcement of ICC decisions in the country.15 The 
combination of these elements has made recourse to CIETAC for international 
commercial arbitrations the option of lower risk for both domestic and foreign 
parties.  
In 2000, the CIETAC Arbitration Rules were amended to expand the organiza-
tion’s jurisdiction to encompass purely domestic arbitrations.16 This change was 
likely made for two reasons. The first was to make the arbitration process in China 
more efficient. Prior to this amendment, there was much uncertainty over what 
constituted a purely domestic business organization versus one that was foreign 
owned. For example, in some instances joint partnerships between foreign and 
domestic firms can be variously characterized as either domestic or foreign ob-
jects.17 Enabling CIETAC to manage both types of arbitrations reduced the 
importance of this distinction and eliminated a potential point of delay in the arbi-
tration process. The second reason was to improve the quality of arbitration as a 
dispute resolution tool in China. The re-creation of CIETAC as a centralized arbi-
tration centre for the country would make arbitration more uniform throughout 
the nation and create a mechanism for the transference of best practices from the 
international domain to the domestic level. 
The most significant revision of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules occurred in 
200518, with the amendments bringing the organization into general compliance 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
(2) The matters decided in the award exceed the scope of the arbitration agreement or are be-
yond the arbitral authority of the arbitration commission;  
(3) The formation of the arbitration tribunal or the arbitration procedure was not in conformity 
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(4) The evidence on which the award is based is forged;  
(5) The other party has withheld the evidence which is sufficient to affect the impartiality of the 
arbitration; or  
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sonal benefits or perverted the law in the arbitration of the case.  
The peoples court shall rule to set aside the arbitration award if a collegial panel formed by the peoples 
court verifies upon examination that the award involves one of the circumstances set forth in the pre-
ceding paragraph.  
If the peoples court determines that the arbitration award violates the public interest, it shall 
rule to set aside the award.  
14 Rechtsanwalt Yves Heinze (“Heinze Law”), Arbitration in China – The Role of CIETAC and Alterna-
tives (2009), online: <http://www.heinze-law.com> at 3.  
15 Freshfields, supra note 9 at 13. 
16 Freshfields, supra note 9 at 16. 
17 Huang Tao & Dai Yue, Forum Shopping in China: CIETAC vs UNCITRAL (April 2008) online: King & 
Wood PRC Lawyers <http://www.kingandwood.com>. 
18 Arbitration Provisions of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade, May 1, 2005. 
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with internationally accepted norms and practices.19 The changes enhanced party 
autonomy, facilitated greater efficiency, and increased the transparency of the arbi-
tral process. Among the changes, three had the most transformative impact on the 
way the organization conducted arbitrations, albeit without greatly diminishing the 
authority of the CEITAC secretariat. The first change was the addition of Article 
4.2 (Article 4.3 as of the May 2012 revision), which gives parties the ability to select 
the rules under which the arbitration will be administered.20 However, as will be 
discussed shortly, this ability is strictly truncated. The second change of signifi-
cance was found in Article 21 (now Article 24.2), which allows for the appointment 
of arbitrators from outside of the prescribed CIETAC panel subject to the discre-
tion of the CIETAC secretariat.21 This has the effect of making the process more 
transparent and flexible for individual participants. Finally, the third change of 
note is that the CIETAC Arbitration Rules now permit the parties to choose be-
tween an inquisitorial approach, as informed by China’s civil law tradition, or the 
adversarial model used in common law jurisdictions and by most established in-
ternational commercial arbitration institutions. This revision was located in Article 
29.3 (now Article 33.3).22 Regardless of this rule, however, Article 41.1 still affords 
the tribunal the ability to initiate investigations at its own discretion.23 
In May 2012, the seventh revision of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules was im-
plemented. While less sweeping than previous revisions, it is significant in that it 
responds to recent changes undertaken by other major international arbitration 
institutions and further establishes CIETAC’s international character.24 Recogniz-
ing the global increase in demand for commercial arbitration facilities, CIETAC 
followed the lead of other major arbitration institutions and implemented mecha-
nisms to enhance efficiency and build capacity. For instance, parties are now able 
to consolidate related arbitrations into a single proceeding.25 The 2012 rules also 
                                                                                                                                                         
19 ILSAC, The Latest Development in CIETAC Arbitration (2007) online: Government of Australia 
<http://www.ilsac.gov.au> at 5.  
20 Arbitration Provisions, supra note 18 at Article 4.2: 
 Where the parties agree to refer their dispute to CIETAC for arbitration but have agreed on a 
modification of these Rules or have agreed on the application of other arbitration rules, the parties’ 
agreement shall prevail unless such agreement is inoperative or in conflict with a mandatory provision 
of the law as it applies to the arbitration proceedings. Where the parties have agreed on the application 
of other arbitration rules, CIETAC shall perform the relevant administrative duties. 
21 Ibid, Article 21: 
 Where the parties have agreed to nominate arbitrators from outside CIETAC’s Panel of 
Arbitrators, an arbitrator so nominated by the parties or nominated according to the agreement of the 
parties may act as arbitrator subject to the confirmation by the Chairman of CIETAC in accordance 
with the law. 
22 Ibid, Article 29.3: 
 Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may adopt an inquisitorial or 
adversarial approach in hearing the case having regard to the circumstances of the case. 
23 Ibid, Article 41.1: 
 The arbitral tribunal may undertake investigations and collect evidence on its own initiative 
as it considers necessary. 
24 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2012), Briefing: CIETAC Releases New Arbitration Rules (Hong 
Kong, 2012) at 2.  
25 Arbitration Provisions of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade, May 1 2012, Article 17.1: 
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formalized CIETAC’s authority to hold arbitrations outside of the PRC.26 This is a 
further step towards CIETAC’s internationalization and potentially allows it to 
position itself as an alternative international framework for commercial arbitra-
tions involving non-Chinese parties. In addition, the new rules also enable parties 
to agree on the language of the proceedings.27 Because of CIETAC’s centralized 
structure, administrative efficiency demanded that all proceedings were in  
Mandarin. However, this rule change makes proceedings more accessible and 
transparent to foreign parties. It may also assist in the diversification of CIETAC’s 
panel of arbitrators and enable greater institutional learning, as proceedings would 
be accessible to more parties. 
Despite CIETAC’s evident trend towards internationalization, it is still imbued 
with characteristics that distinguish it from the other dominant international insti-
tutions in this field. In order to better understand CIETAC’s development in 
response to domestic and international pressures, it is necessary to locate the or-
ganization in the broader context of China’s post-Maoist economic and legal 
culture. 
Economic and legal culture of China 
In thirty years of economic reform, China has developed unique economic and 
legal cultures that seek to facilitate the operations of a modern market economy 
and attempt to reconcile the numerous contradictions inherent in a society, and 
economy, transitioning from communism to a nominally capitalist model. In this 
brief overview of China’s contemporary economic and legal culture, this paper will 
first consider the nature of market socialism, or “socialism with Chinese character-
istics.” It will then evaluate the predominant cultural tenet of economic practice in 
China, guanxi. In terms of the country’s legal culture, the paper will then move to 
the tension that exists in the PRC between the rule of law (Fa) and informal social 
mechanisms of incentivization and reprimand (Li). Underlying this distinction is 
the social imperative of achieving harmony, which this paper will consider in the 
context of historical and proximate factors.  
The economic dynamic which has emerged in China since reform commenced 
in 1978 is a dualist model: one which allows for the investment and growth of capi-
tal, while legitimating the authority of the state to intervene to create markets and 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
 At the request of a party and with the agreement of all the other parties, or where CIETAC 
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pending under these Rules into a single arbitration. 
26 Ibid, Article 34.2: 
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administered by the Secretariat of CIETAC or at the domicile of the sub-commission/center which 
administers the case, or if the arbitral tribunal considers it necessary and with the approval of the Secre-
tary-General of CIETAC, at another location. 
27 Ibid, Article 71.1: 
Where the parties have agreed on the language of arbitration, their agreement shall prevail. 
In the absence of such agreement, the language of arbitration to be used in the proceedings shall be 
Chinese or any other language designated by CIETAC having regard to the circumstances of the case. 
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protect vested interests. The balance between these two objectives is precarious, but 
it is one that Beijing assiduously maintains because it views market-driven eco-
nomic growth as essential for continued social stability.28 The Communist Party of 
China (CPC) must provide for the conditions necessary for the operation of the 
market, but also maintain enough policy instruments at its disposal to guide the 
development of China in a direction that achieves both stability and prosperity. 
In the context of China’s market socialist economy, a unique economic culture 
has developed that fuses historical Chinese business practices with the realities of a 
globalized economy. One of the most significant features of modern Chinese eco-
nomic culture is the prevalence of a unique type of network relationship called 
guanxi. These differ from the business networks common in the West by virtue of 
their emphasis on permanent relations of trust and loyalty.29 In contrast to West-
ern-style networks that are typified by opportunistic and often fleeting 
relationships, networks based on the guanxi model bind actors to mutual service 
and are assumed to be more enduring in nature.30 The presence of these networks 
in China’s economy is partly due to historical factors, rooted in Confucianism, 
which emphasize the precedence of interpersonal relationships and partly out of a 
response to corruption endemic throughout the nation’s economy which makes it 
necessary for businesspeople to have close personal contacts with power holders in 
order to be treated favourably.31 The implications of guanxi can be evidenced in the 
predominant Chinese attitude towards the rule of law.  
Historically, disputes in China were settled by way of private and informal 
mechanisms. The formal legal system pertained to only disputes that directly im-
pacted the state and capital offences. Civil disagreements, such as contractual 
claims, were resolved in a manner insulated from the public sphere to allow the 
parties to “save face”32 and to ensure that basis of the dispute was settled in a non-
adversarial fashion. The preference towards this non-institutional and interest-
based approach to dispute resolution was grounded in the Chinese notion of li, in 
which the law was constituted by mutual expectations of obligation and duty.33 
This is in contrast to the rule of law, or fa, which emerged in abundance subse-
quent to the 1949 revolution. The intercession of the state into private law matters 
and legal positivism, generally, were concepts that were anathematic to the tradi-
tional methods of legal ordering. The transition to a positivist conception of the 
law in China is still ongoing. Traditional concepts of dispute resolution still per-
vade and are not likely to be fully displaced, even with external pressures 
                                                                                                                                                         
28 LLP Gore, Market communism: The institutional foundation of China’s post-Mao hyper-growth (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 5. 
29 B Dickson, Red capitalists in China: The party, private entrepreneurs, and prospects for political change 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 60. 
30 Ibid. 
31 C McNally, “Insinuations on China’s emergent capitalism” (2006) 15 East-West Centre Working Pa-
pers: Politics, Governance, and Security Series at 41.  
32 Carlos de Vera, “Arbitrating harmony: ‘Med-arb’ and the confluence of culture and rule of law in the 
resolution of international commercial disputes in China” (2004) 18:1 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 
149 at 166. “Face” as equivalent to “honour.” 
33 Ibid at 162. 
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demanding an enhanced rule of law in areas such as contractual disputes.34 The 
likely outcome is a mixed system, containing elements of both approaches.  
As a corollary to the prevalence of li in China’s legal culture, the imperative of 
achieving harmony has been described as being an overarching objective in China’s 
approach to legal ordering. De Vera argues that the utilization of informal, private 
dispute resolution tools detracts from the protection of individual rights, as there is 
no supervening authority to ensure the protection of weaker parties. However, he 
goes on to state that this is reflective of the prioritization that Chinese culture lends 
to the expedient resolution of disputes and the maintenance of harmony.35 De Vera 
notes the concept of rang, which holds that the central purpose of dispute resolu-
tion is to restore harmony and balance.36 Justice is defined not by the preservation 
of individual rights, but by the creation of a new status quo that recognizes the 
proper ordering of social relationships.  
Though the contemporary Chinese state has an interest in ensuring the con-
sistency and reliability of dispute resolution processes and has directed the further 
development of the country’s court system in this regard, the preference remains 
strong among the Chinese business community for informal dispute resolution 
processes that are tailored to restore positive relationships between parties. The 
principal objective of the Chinese state is to support economic growth by achieving 
social stability. But as De Vera remarks, Beijing recognizes that the informal system 
of private dispute resolution mechanisms may be better suited for settling conflict 
between actors in guanxi networks than the adversarial system of the judiciary, 
which is premised on the notion of economic actors as being autonomous.37 
Factors in the development of CIETAC 
Having established the cultural context for the development of CIETAC, the 
paper will now consider the broader pressures that have structured the organiza-
tion’s approach to arbitration. Two factors that are of particular relevance to the 
current form of the organization will be discussed. The first relates to the interna-
tional sphere and the manner in which the current form of CIETAC is the 
culmination of both external pressures and an instrumentalization of the organiza-
tion within the context of China’s foreign policy. The second factor, often 
operating against the dynamic imposed by international considerations, concerns 
the PRC’s domestic policy objective of achieving domestic economic development 
that is sustainable and that maintains the integrity of the state and the leading role 
of the CPC within it. Together, both of these factors have converged to influence 
the growth of CIETAC into an organization that accords with generally accepted 
norms and practices while advancing its own, unique model of arbitration.  
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35 Ibid at 168. 
36 Ibid at 168. 
37 Ibid at 169. 




Since the adoption of the “peaceful rise” doctrine in the 1990s, China has 
sought to increase its participation in international institutions. Its principal objec-
tive in doing so is to leverage the existing global order by embedding itself in estab-
established networks of international trade and commerce.38 The PRC also views 
this more intensive integration as a means to assuage Western and regional con-
cerns that it is opposed to the dominant global power structure and is seeking to 
construct itself as a hegemon. By participating in such institutions, it is expressing 
its acceptance of institutional norms and is sharing in the collective burden of 
maintaining the international system. As a result of this deeper integration, China 
also has an opportunity to influence the ongoing evolution of these institutions.39 
The entrance of CIETAC into the global institutional system of commercial arbi-
tration exemplifies this dual trend in Chinese foreign relations. CIETAC represents 
both an attempt to leverage an existing institutional arrangement as well as to initi-
ate alterations, through the introduction of an alternative approach to arbitration, 
that will enhance the responsiveness of the global institution to China’s interests. 
In explaining this dualist approach, two theories pertaining to the engagement 
of countries with global institutions are relevant. The first, the functionalist theory 
of institutions, articulates that states engage with global institutions to reduce 
transaction costs and to supplement poorly functioning domestic institutions. 40 
This is a rationalist conception of state behaviour and presumes that states exploit 
institutions in a way that will enhance their material interests. This behaviour can 
be seen in the way that CIETAC has assimilated international norms and practices 
and has been used as a means to enhance China’s capacity to conduct arbitrations 
both domestically and with foreign parties. 
The second theory, path dependency theory, prescribes a contrary means of 
understanding the engagement of states with institutions.41 It proposes that the 
participation of states in institutions is premised on ideological grounds. Rather 
than subscribing to institutions for reasons of immediate material gain, states en-
gage with institutions to legitimate their position within the global order and to use 
them as vehicles for the normalization of behaviours that are advantageous to their 
interests both internationally and domestically. The theory also presumes that the 
ongoing creation and revision of institutions is path dependent, meaning that new 
institutions simply perpetuate existing cultural tools, except in a format more con-
ducive to the present conditions.42 The deliberate maintenance of CIETAC’s 
distinctive character is an active example of this theory. While CIETAC has be-
come compliant with the overarching norms of the international arbitration 
system, it still contains elements that distinguish it and which position the organi-
zation as an alternative to the dominant model. These elements create an avenue 
                                                                                                                                                         
38 Rosemary Foot, “China’s Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging” 
(2006) 82:1 International Affairs 77 at 78.  
39 Ibid at 87.  
40 Barry Weingast, “Rational-choice institutionalism,” in Ira Katznelson and Helen V Milner, eds, Politi-
cal Science: State of the Discipline (New York and London: W W Norton & Company, 2002) at 670. 
41 Colin Hay, “Contemporary capitalism, globalization, regionalization and the persistence of national 
variation” (2000) 26 Review of International Studies 26 at 529. 
42 Wilson, supra note 2 at 31.  
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through which the PRC can project its influence in this important global institu-
tional framework.  
In explaining the development of CIETAC, neither of these theories will alone 
suffice. Because the PRC is committed to an export-led model of development, the 
path dependency theory is irrelevant in isolation as the country has a tangible in-
terest in leveraging the immediate material benefits of a robust commercial 
arbitration framework. The internationalization of CIETAC demonstrates that 
China is willing to accede to global norms and bolster the confidence of foreign 
businesses by providing a mechanism for resolving disputes with Chinese firms. 
Nor is the functionalist theory of institutions fully applicable. While China does, 
indeed, seek to exploit institutions for their material potential, it also has a strong 
interest in securing a global order that best corresponds with its own norms and 
practices. The distinct arbitration culture of CIETAC represents this. Only when 
these theories are considered in conjunction with each other, will the complex in-
terplay between the development of CIETAC and international pressures become 
apparent. 
CIETAC as an alternative to domestic courts 
The most immediate objective of the gradual internationalization of CIETAC 
has been to create an arbitration centre that would enhance the confidence of for-
eign businesses operating in the PRC. A centre that held to generally accepted 
arbitration norms would provide a predictable framework for these businesses to 
resolve disputes with their Chinese counterparts. This requirement was eminently 
necessary because of the perceived inconsistency and fragmentation of the Chinese 
court system. 
Since 1978, Beijing has endeavoured to consolidate the rule of law in the PRC 
in order replace the “rule by man” philosophy that had emerged under the dicta-
torship of Mao Zedong.43 The rule of law is premised in a robust judiciary, which 
the central government has made noticeable progress in cultivating. However, be-
cause of the highly decentralized manner in which the law has been traditionally 
administered in China, the construction of a cohesive court system has been com-
plicated. The typical practice for the implementation of national policies in China 
is that policy objectives and broad delivery mechanisms are advanced by the cen-
tral government, while the execution of the policy is delegated to regional and local 
governments.44 This localization of policy implementation often leads to significant 
disparities across sub-national units in the actualization of policy. This is evidence 
in the administration of the national court system, where standards vary greatly 
between regions in terms of the interpretation of the law and the training of judg-
es.45  
The court system is also viewed by officials as an extension of local guanxi rela-
tionships.46 Courts are functionalized by governments to legitimate pre-existing 
relationships and are leveraged as tools of economic development, favouring cer-
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tain individuals and businesses. The absence of consistency in the application of 
the rule of law and endemic corruption creates uncertainty for foreign businesses 
seeking recourse in the institutionalized Chinese legal system. The absence of cer-
tainty reduces the risk tolerance of foreign businesses seeking to make productive 
investments in the country.  
The commercial arbitration framework provided by CIETAC represents a suit-
able compromise between Chinese legal culture and the requirement of foreign 
businesses for the predictable and transparent administration of the rule of law. 
Arbitration is the preferred means of dispute resolution in China and CIETAC 
provides this in a framework that is acceptable to foreign interests. CIETAC fulfills 
the requirement for effective legal recourse that is otherwise unfulfilled by the do-
mestic court system. While a measure of risk remains in the enforcement of 
arbitral decisions in China, the 1994 Arbitration Law provides a clear and widely 
accepted linkage between the validity of CIETAC awards and the obligation of do-
mestic courts to enforce them. 
CIETAC as a mechanism of foreign policy 
In addition to the obvious benefits that CIETAC yields in legitimating the rule 
of law with respect to foreign businesses operating in China, the organization pro-
vides an avenue through which the PRC can project its influence into the 
established institutional framework of commercial arbitration. By providing for an 
internationally oriented arbitration facility, CIETAC is able to function as a legiti-
mized means by which China can establish components of its economic and 
political culture in the international domain. The existence of these tools as part of 
the global commercial arbitration infrastructure gives China a forum where it can 
engage with the international community on terms that it is most adept at manag-
ing, while still abiding by generally-accepted tenets. This is consistent with the 
country’s overarching foreign policy directive that emphasizes deeper integration 
into the global order while reconstituting it in a way that benefits the country’s 
interests.47 
The intersection of CIETAC with the PRC’s foreign policy is not direct; 
CIETAC operates as a nominally independent organization under the jurisdiction 
of a non-profit agency. However, as Lijun Cao, Deputy Director of CIETAC’s 
Business Department, writes, the central government approves the organization’s 
budget and holds veto power over significant decisions, such as revisions to the 
CIETAC Arbitration Rules.48 Moreover, the operations of CIETAC and its parent 
organization are heavily influenced by the PRC’s foreign policy. Rather than being 
a direct instrument, CIETAC functions in harmony with the broader directions set 
by Beijing. Its success as an organization is contingent on the quality of its contri-
bution to the development of a legal structure which balances both foreign and 
domestic interests. 
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From 1990 to 2011, CIETAC’s annual caseload expanded from 203 cases to 
1282.49 This growth is attributable to not only an increase in foreign business ac-
tivity in China, but also to an increased recognition of the quality of CIETAC as an 
arbitration centre.50 While Chinese parties often insist on designating CIETAC in 
arbitration agreements as the site of the arbitration proceedings, foreign parties 
have historically been reluctant to do so. In the wake of both the 1995 and 2005 
revisions, however, CIETAC’s caseload experienced immediate surges of approxi-
mately 50% and 30%, respectively.51 This was likely due to the reforms that these 
revisions introduced into the CIETAC Arbitration Rules which brought them into 
closer alignment with international norms and made the organization more attrac-
tive to non-Chinese parties. The growing acceptance by the international 
community of CIETAC is occurring despite the organization’s retention of key 
elements that are inextricably linked to China’s economic and legal culture.  
Leveraging the momentum gained by the progressive internationalization of 
CIETAC, the organization has undertaken to further establish itself as a significant 
player in the international arbitration system. As part of the 2012 reform package, 
the organization gained the ability to hear cases in locations other than mainland 
China.52 This is noteworthy because it expanded the functional jurisdiction of 
CIETAC to encompass disputes involving Chinese companies operating in foreign 
locations. These types of disputes have become increasingly common as Chinese 
firms establish operations abroad. While the CIETAC Arbitration Rules have never 
prohibited the organization from hearing such cases, the practical dimension of 
being constrained to holding hearings within the PRC made doing so inefficient. 
As of May 2012, however, CIETAC tribunals were no longer territorially bound, 
thereby significantly expanding the potential number of disputes falling under its 
purview and enhancing its international impact. 
Domestic 
While international pressures are dictating the forward progression of CIETAC 
towards internationalization, domestic pressures are acting simultaneously to re-
strain this rate of reform. The primary counter-dynamic arises from the 
incrementalist mode of market liberalization adopted by the Chinese state. This 
model stipulates a gradual transition to a nominally market-based economy. As a 
tool for attracting foreign investment, CIETAC has, as well, followed this method-
ology.  
With the chaos and instability of the Maoist era having shaped the current gen-
eration of Chinese leadership, the overarching precept of the country’s economic 
development is the maintenance of political and social stability.53 The CPC had its 
                                                                                                                                                         
49 CIETAC, Cases Resolved by CIETAC, online: <http://www.cietac.org/index.cms>. This number de-
clined precipitously in 2012 to 720 due to the secession of the Shanghai and Shenzhen arbitration 
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50 ILSAC, supra note 19 at 4.  
51 CIETAC, supra note 49.  
52 Article 34(2), supra note 26. 
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normative roots in the command economy; it was this type of economics that 
would deliver the class equality that communism was premised on. The transition 
to a nominally market-based economy, therefore, destabilized this important pillar 
of the party’s legitimacy to rule. To re-legitimate itself as the natural governing 
authority of the PRC, the party began to reconstitute itself as a guarantor of the 
continuing prosperity of the country. It also appealed to a nascent Chinese nation-
alism founded in traditional Chinese symbolisms that supported the concentration 
of power in a single ruling institution.54 Because of this, the transition to a market-
based economy was incremental to allow for a gradual technical and normative 
transformation in the party’s ideological base and to avoid the social pitfalls of the 
rapid “shock therapy” reforms which had occurred in former Eastern bloc coun-
tries after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
As an example of this gradualism, state-owned corporations were incrementally 
privatized or insulated from direct state control and township and village enter-
prises were introduced to stimulate local innovation and investment.55 The 
composition of CIETAC evolved in tandem with this development process. In or-
der to protect the deliberate expansion of investment opportunities in China, 
CIETAC maintained its highly centralized nature throughout much of the reform 
period. The competency of the organization’s secretariat to review individual 
awards prior to their disclosure, in particular, ensured that the decisions of the tri-
bunals were in alignment with the developmentalist agenda of the state.56 
While the imperatives of development have demanded the responsiveness of 
CIETAC to external pressures, they have also underscored the requirement for 
CIETAC’s reformation to be incremental and conducted in harmony with domes-
tic economic and political change. 
Defining characteristics of CIETAC 
The confluence of international and domestic pressures has constituted 
CIETAC in a way that distinguishes it from other international arbitration centres. 
This paper will review the four most defining features of the organization and lo-
cate them in the context of the factors that have influenced its development. It will 
also evaluate the impact of these features on the effectiveness of the CIETAC sys-
tem. The four characteristics are as follows: CIETAC’s high level of institutional 
centrality; the presence of provisions allowing for mediation-arbitration in the 
CIETAC Arbitration Rules; the organization’s overarching focus on efficiency; and 
the role of CIETAC tribunals as inquisitorial.  
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56 Arbitration Provisions, supra note 25 at Article 49: 
 The arbitral tribunal shall submit its draft award to CIETAC for scrutiny before signing the 
award. CIETAC may bring to the attention of the arbitral tribunal issues addressed in the award on the 
condition that the arbitral tribunal’s independence in rendering the award is not affected. 
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Institutional centralization 
Among the world’s arbitration centres, CIETAC is considered to be the most 
interventionist.57 Despite the successful internationalization of the organization 
and initiatives to devolve greater procedural control to individual parties, it retains 
a strong secretariat that possesses broad powers to structure the operational aspects 
of individual tribunals. In particular, the CIETAC Arbitration Rules protect these 
powers from being usurped by the discretionary adoption of ad hoc rules by the 
arbitrating parties. The maintenance of this centralized authority is likely residue 
from CIETAC’s origins in a command economy as well as a deliberate policy deci-
sion to retain a mechanism to ensure the adhesion of CIETAC to the developmen-
developmentalist agenda of the state.  
While Article 4.3 of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules permits parties to adopt 
procedural rules different from those enunciated in the CIETAC Arbitration Rules, 
this permission does not apply to Chapter 2 – Arbitration Proceedings, which gov-
erns the initiation, composition, and conduct of tribunals.58 This prevents the 
application of alternative procedural frameworks, such as the more flexible model 
allowed for in the UNCITRAL Rules, to CIETAC proceedings. Article 4.3 also pro-
vides for the restriction of ad hoc rules where they are “inoperative or in conflict of 
the law as it applies to the arbitration proceedings.” This considers the proposed ad 
hoc rules in the context of Chinese law, generally, as it may pertain to the arbitra-
tion process and has been frequently interpreted by Chinese courts as a complete 
bar against the application of such rules in CIETAC proceedings.59 D’Agostino 
argues that this broad interpretation of Article 4.3 flows from the proper interpre-
tation of the Chinese term for “inoperative,” which has been otherwise translated 
verbatim in the official English language rules.60 He argues that because the direct 
translation neglects the nuance inflecting the Chinese term, the more appropriate 
English analogue would be the word “inconsistent.” This interpretation lowers the 
threshold for finding ad hoc rules to be invalid by requiring only that the proposed 
rule is different, either in purpose or intention, from Chinese arbitration law. The 
ad hoc rule need not be in direct opposition to an existing precept to be ruled inva-
lid. Consequently, alterations made to the CIETAC Arbitration Rules outside of 
Chapter 2 may be more likely to be found invalid by the courts. This remains a 
point of ambiguity in Chinese law and has not yet been clarified by either the 
courts or the government. 
The protection that Article 4.3 affords to the procedural aspects of the CIETAC 
Arbitration Rules has made certain provisions mandatory that serve to distinguish 
CIETAC from other international arbitration centres and which reinforce the ad-
ministrative authority of the secretariat. This paper will briefly canvas three of 
these provisions. 
                                                                                                                                                         
57 Justin D’Agostino, “Mixing and matching arbitration rules in mainland China – the pros and cons of 
using the UNCITRAL Rules in CIETAC arbitration” (March 15 2011) online: Kluwer Arbitration Blog 
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The first provision is Article 49, which obligates tribunals to submit draft 
awards to the CIETAC secretariat for review prior to the disclosure of the award to 
the parties.61 This differs from the approach used by other international arbitration 
systems, such as the ICC and SIAC, wherein central review mechanisms are not 
mandatory but are available at the discretion of the parties.62 The opinions of the 
secretariat from the CIETAC process are not binding on the tribunal, maintaining 
the independence of the tribunal. The value of this mechanism to CIETAC and the 
state is that it provides a direct feedback mechanism between the immediate sub-
ject matter of the tribunal and the broader policy considerations of CIETAC and 
the government. It also serves as a mechanism to ensure the consistency of deci-
sions across CIETAC’s disparate tribunals—a function of particular importance 
concerning the relative immaturity of the organization relative to its global coun-
terparts and the absence of a definitive system of precedent in international law, 
generally, and the civil law system specifically. Whereas tribunals may otherwise 
arrive at a decision in isolation of the larger context that the commission is situated 
within, Article 49 allows for the intercession of the secretariat while protecting the 
integrity of the arbitration. The tribunal exercises independent discretion as to 
whether to accept this feedback in its final judgment, thereby ensuring the fairness 
and transparency of the arbitral process. If the feedback is implemented, it is done 
so in consultation with the parties.  
The second provision is Article 6.1, which empowers the CIETAC secretariat 
with adjudicative authority in disputes over the jurisdiction of the organization.63 
The centralization of this function on the secretariat departs from the typical mod-
el for finding jurisdiction in international commercial arbitrations. In most 
institutional arbitration centres, this task is under the expressed purview of the 
individual tribunal as per the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle.64 However, the sec-
retariat can delegate this authority to the arbitral tribunal if the secretariat deems 
necessary. The presence of this provision influences the arbitration process in two 
ways. First, it arguably enhances the efficiency and objectivity of the arbitration 
process. With decisions of jurisdiction being centralized on a single entity, the 
framework used to assess such questions can be standardized and a nexus of exper-
tise on this matter can be cultivated. Second, it divorces the adjudicative process for 
jurisdictional issues from the localized expertise provided by individual tribunal 
panels. In most instances, panels have a familiarity with the subject matter that the 
secretariat may lack. The separation of jurisdictional issues from the purview of the 
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tribunal marginalizes the impact of this key contextual element in assessments of 
CIETAC’s scope of authority.  
The final aspect of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules that is mandatory across all 
arbitrations administered by the commission concerns the appointment of arbitra-
tors. This is encapsulated by Articles 24 and 25, which, together, govern the 
appointment of arbitrators to CIETAC tribunals. 
Article 24 requires that party select arbitrators from the CIETAC Panel, a list of 
998 individuals whom the CIETAC secretariat has deemed qualified to serve as 
arbitrators in CIETAC proceedings.65 The disposition of this panel reflects the in-
creasing internationalization of the commission. As of 2011, approximately 28% of 
the panel is comprised of foreign nationals.66 This has been the consequence of a 
deliberate effort by CIETAC since 1989 to balance the need for the standardization 
of arbitrators with the requirement of diversity for both the sake of appearance and 
the external knowledge that doing so contributes to the institution.67 However, if 
the parties prefer to select an arbitrator from outside of the CIETAC Panel, Article 
24.2 states that the approval of the chairman of CIETAC must be obtained for the 
appointment to occur, thus maintaining the ability of the secretariat to regulate the 
qualifications of all arbitrators operating within the CIETAC system.  
Article 25 prescribes a framework for appointment that significantly constrains 
the length of time afforded to parties in which to agree on the composition of the 
tribunal.68 Rather than the five months allowed for by the UNCITRAL Rules, Arti-
cle 25 of CIETAC specifies a time limit of thirty days for parties to select a panel of 
three arbitrators. Although this measure enhances the efficiency of the arbitral pro-
cess, it may create a structural bias in favour of Chinese parties that are experienced 
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the above provisions, the presiding arbitrator shall be appointed by the Chairman of CIETAC. 
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with the CIETAC framework and familiar with the pre-approved arbitrators that 
comprise the CIETAC Panel. 
The protection of procedural elements of the CIETAC against replacement 
with ad hoc rules in tribunal proceedings has given the organization’s arbitrations a 
distinct character and has maintained the interventionist character of the commis-
sion. 
Despite the legal centrality of the organization, the recent changes made in the 
2012 Arbitration Rules have exposed functional divisions within CIETAC. To facil-
itate the efficient delivery of arbitration services in a country of China’s size, 
CIETAC operates, in part, through regional sub-commissions. Although they are 
nominally extensions of the Secretariat in Beijing, they exercise some autonomy to 
the extent that they stringently adapt the CIETAC to regional expectations and 
practices.69 For reasons not officially reported, the Shanghai and South China Sub-
Commissions rejected the new rules shortly after their implementation in May 
2012 and announced that they would secede from the legal and administrative 
framework of CIETAC.70 The CIETAC Secretariat responded by issuing a directive 
removing the authorization of these sub-commissions to adjudicate arbitrations 
and subsuming all existing arbitration agreements subscribing to the jurisdiction of 
these sub-commissions under the jurisdiction of the CIETAC Secretariat in Bei-
jing.71 
There has been little speculation as to the cause of these divisions, but a proba-
ble explanation could be that the sub-commissions are exploiting the loosening of 
restrictions as to the choice of arbitration rules to create a domestic alternative to 
the CIETAC monopoly. This would enable forum-shopping, allowing parties to 
pursue the arbitration system most likely to determine in their favour. While not 
explicitly prevented by the 1994 Arbitration Law, it would likely be seen as an 
anathema to the efforts of the state to create an integrated commercial arbitration 
apparatus and would, for this reason, be opposed by the government. Moreover, 
the recognition of CIETAC awards by the PRC’s judiciary and the organization’s 
established reputation would render these divergent sub-commissions as high-risk 
alternatives in a country where the rule of law is still uncertain.72 
The implications of this split are as yet unknown, but will likely not adversely 
affect the development of CIETAC as the principal mechanism for commercial 
arbitrations in the PRC because of the predictability that it offers. 
Mediation-Arbitration and CIETAC 
The second defining feature of CIETAC is that it provides for mediation-
arbitration (med-arb) within the framework of the commission. Article 45 of the 
CIETAC Arbitration Rules sets forth a scheme whereby parties can agree to use a 
tribunal convened under CIETAC as mediators with the understanding that the 
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same panel will adjudicate the subsequent arbitration if the conciliation fails.73 This 
facility is unique among international commercial arbitration centres. While other 
centres allow for both mediation and arbitration, CIETAC is the only organization 
that adopts a combined approach.74  
This methodology has elicited criticism for compromising the impartiality of 
arbitrators and undermining the integrity of both the mediation and arbitration. 
Critics contend that the ability of tribunals to objectively assess the positions of the 
parties in an arbitration will be adversely influenced by the comparatively unstruc-
tured disclosure of information during the mediation.75 Although Article 45.9 
prevents evidence and statements arising from the mediation from being intro-
duced into the arbitration, authors, such as de Vera, argue the practical 
impossibility of expecting arbitrators to selectively “forget” elements of the media-
tion.76 
However, as de Vera also argues, this feature of CIETAC’s med-arb methodol-
ogy and the expected diminishment of the tribunal’s objectivity is an anticipated 
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 (1) Where both parties wish to conciliate, or where one party wishes to conciliate and the 
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an arbitration agreement concluded between them that provides for arbitration by CIETAC and the 
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accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the 
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amine the case in a procedure it considers appropriate and render an award in due course. The specific 
procedure and time limit for rendering the award shall not be subject to other provisions of these Rules. 
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outcome of the arbitration process for parties that are conditioned in Chinese legal 
norms.77 According to de Vera, the mediation and arbitration components are not 
viewed in isolation; they are conceptualized as overlapping elements of a process 
which prioritizes the restoration of harmony between the parties over the protec-
tion of autonomy.  
Moreover, the integration of the two mechanisms allows for greater efficiency 
and the maintenance of positive relations between parties. Historically, Western 
interests have also not been averse to using the med-arb facility. As of 2012, ap-
proximately 20-30% of the international commercial disputes administered by 
CIETAC have been resolved using Article 45.78  
Going forward, the ability of parties to select mediation-arbitration under Arti-
cle 45 may affect the evolution and integration of CIETAC into the international 
commercial arbitration system in two respects. 
First, the dissonance between the practices contained in Article 45 and predom-
inant international conventions exposes CIETAC to the risk of reputational harm 
should problems arise with this mechanism. More so than any other provision of 
the CIETAC Rules, Article 45 reflects the cultural distinctiveness of CIETAC in 
terms of its prioritization of the restoration of harmony between parties.79 In allow-
ing the same individuals to serve as both mediators and arbitrators in the same 
ruling, the provision heightens the vulnerability of the CIETAC system to isolated 
incidents of indiscretion among its arbitrators. The failure of arbitrators to ade-
quately compartmentalize the mediation and arbitration proceedings could serve 
to jeopardize the reputation of the organization as a whole and undermine its ef-
forts to legitimate itself among its peers in the international community.  
The second challenge presented by Article 45 is that the perceived impartiality 
of adjudicators in mediation-arbitration proceedings may affect the enforceability 
of CIETAC decisions arrived at through this mechanism in other jurisdictions. 
This is particularly problematic in Western jurisdictions where party autonomy is a 
defining value and the role of adjudicators is tightly circumscribed.80 In these cases, 
CIETAC decisions may be set-aside due to an apparent failure of the process to 
insulate the arbitration panel from submissions made during mediation.  
Although the enforcement of CIETAC decisions in foreign jurisdictions is pro-
vided for under the New York Convention, domestic courts retain the right to 
reject arbitration decisions on the grounds of procedural fairness.81 The recent 
Hong Kong decision of Gao Haiyan v Keeneye Holdings Ltd exemplifies this possi-
bility with respect to Article 45.82 In that case, the court rejected a CIETAC 
decision arrived at through this procedure because of the appearance of bias arising 
from the combined role of mediator and arbitrator. The court remarked that while 
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the mechanism is not fundamentally unsound, it is subject to a high degree of risk 
from actual and perceived bias.83  
These challenges aside, in terms of the innovation that CIETAC brings to the 
global commercial arbitration institution, the combined mediation-arbitration tool 
provided by Article 45 is perhaps the most valuable. Though its operationalization 
conflicts with prevalent Western notions of party autonomy, it serves as a useful 
template for an approach that maximizes efficiency while minimizing the potential 
harms of adversarial dispute resolution. 
The imperative of efficiency 
Influenced by the culturally-prescribed prioritization of harmonious dispute 
resolution and the external pressures associated with the PRC’s integration into the 
global economy, efficiency has been a principal focus of CIETAC’s reform. Though 
efficiency is a concern of most international arbitration centres, due to increasing 
caseloads, CIETAC is exceptional in the degree to which it is expressed through its 
practices and rules. This focus on efficiency is evidenced in both the normative 
foundations of the operations of the tribunals and in the rules that govern CIETAC 
arbitrations.  
According to a 2011 study by linguists Han Zhengrui and Li Xiaoyu, the imper-
ative of the efficient resolution of disputes in CIETAC proceedings extends beyond 
the boundaries established by the CIETAC Arbitration Rules.84 In their discursive 
analysis of thirty representative CIETAC decisions from the past decade, they 
found that the precedential value of the awards were often diminished by an ab-
sence of clear reasoning and appropriate citations locating the decisions in the 
broader legal context. While CIETAC tribunal decisions are rarely disclosed to the 
public, they do serve as valuable mechanisms for institutional learning and provide 
a mechanism of internal precedent for parties that regularly use the arbitration 
centre. The authors characterized the reasoning provided in CIETAC arbitral deci-
sions as pro forma, done to satisfy the “socially recognized purpose of observing 
standardized CIETAC Arbitration Rules.”85 The functional emphasis is on efficien-
cy as defined by an expeditious and direct result. The rising popularity of CIETAC 
as an arbitration centre is a testament to the fairness of its tribunals; nonetheless, 
the provision of clear reasons can only enhance the evolution of the organization. 
The imperative of efficiency is also expressed through the CIETAC Arbitration 
Rules, principally in terms of the timing provisions and the availability of summary 
judgment. Whereas the UNCITRAL Rules delegate the time limits for such matters 
as the serving of documents and the issuance of awards to the discretion of the in-
dividual tribunal, the CIETAC Arbitration Rules specify non-negotiable time limits 
for these activities.86 For example, Articles 1487 and 1588 of the CIETAC Arbitration 
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Rules indicate that statements of defense and counterclaims, respectively, must be 
submitted 45 days from receipt of the Notice of Arbitration. As well, Article 46.1 
requires that tribunals render their award within 6 months of the date on which the 
tribunal is formed.89 The CIETAC Arbitration Rules, through Chapter IV, also 
provide for summary judgment of matters concerning amounts of RMB 2,000,000 
or less. Provisions for summary judgments are rare among international commer-
cial arbitration organizations, but Chapter IV allows for such a procedure wherein 
evidence can be adduced exclusively through written submissions and an award 
issued within three months of the formation of the tribunal. 
The strict approach to procedure exemplified in the CIETAC Rules is reflective 
of the nature of the organization as an instrument in the development of a modern 
market economy in the PRC and as a tool to both adapt to and influence the coun-
try’s international environment. 
As mentioned previously, the institutionalization of a predictable rule of law is 
foundational to the PRC’s transformation into a modern market economy.90 As 
part of this emerging legal structure, CIETAC operates as a mechanism to assure 
foreign parties of a fair and binding avenue through which disputes with their do-
mestic Chinese counterparts can be resolved. However, the procedural protections 
accompanying this system conflict with the developmentalist imperative of maxim-
izing the efficient allocation of capital. It is in the best interest of achieving 
sustained economic growth to facilitate the expeditious resolution of economic 
disputes. Rather than adopt the flexible procedural approach used by UNCITRAL, 
CIETAC has implemented procedural rules that stipulate defined time limits and 
allow for the efficient conduct of proceedings. While these standards depart from 
international norms, they represent an attempt to balance assurances of procedural 
protection with procedural efficiency.  
The strict procedural paradigm employed by CIETAC is also the result of in-
ternational pressure, specifically in regards to historical concerns about the 
reliability of the PRC’s legal apparatuses.91 The implementation of defined proce-
dures, in contrast to the ad hoc ones allowed for under the UNCITRAL Rules, 
provides an objective assurance of procedural integrity. The variability permitted 
by the UNCITRAL Rules may undermine the careful efforts of the organization to 
distance itself from historical perceptions of the PRC’s legal system as arbitrary and 
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to cultivate a reputation of consistency. Although the UNCITRAL Rules are broad-
ly accepted in the international community, they lack the predictability required to 
reinforce the perception of CIETAC’s commitment to the rule of law in the context 
of a still uncertain Chinese legal system.  
Internationally, the extensive procedural rules set forth by CIETAC and its em-
phasis on efficiency are also exemplifications of the instrumentalization of the 
organization as a tool to influence the development of the country’s external envi-
ronment. The practice of the organization in these two areas departs significantly 
from standard international practice, therefore positioning CIETAC as an alterna-
tive model for the settlement of commercial disputes. The CIETAC model is 
especially attractive to parties that prioritize the expeditious resolution of commer-
cial disputes over the ability to exercise procedural discretion. This may increase its 
prominence relative to other arbitration centres that espouse the UNCITRAL rules, 
particularly in East Asia where CIETAC has expanded its competitive presence by 
recently establishing the CIETAC Hong Kong Arbitration Center.92 
The adaptation of CIETAC to generally accepted international standards has 
been inflected with a strong emphasis on procedural efficiency. For reasons 
grounded both in culture and practicality, the prioritization of efficiency has been 
more evident with CIETAC than with other arbitration centres and frameworks. 
However, a principal advantage of arbitration as a dispute resolution tool is that it 
allows parties the flexibility to elect the procedural framework best suited to their 
circumstances and economic imperatives. The strict approach used by CIETAC 
suppresses this flexibility and while it has distinctive benefits in terms of efficiency 
and predictability, there is a risk that it could adversely affect CIETAC’s ability to 
adapt to the evolving needs of commercial parties.  
CIETAC tribunals as inquisitorial 
The final distinguishing characteristic of CIETAC is the presence of Article 41, 
which empowers tribunals to undertake investigations independent of the individ-
ual parties.93 While parties can use Article 33.3 to elect between either the 
adversarial or inquisitorial approach as the dominant structure of the arbitration, 
the tribunal reserves the authority to initiate investigations where it deems neces-
sary.94 
This authority is unusual among international commercial arbitration frame-
works because it contradicts the prioritization of party autonomy. It concedes an 
independent ability to the arbitrators to shape the proceedings. Though other in-
ternational commercial arbitration centres operating in civil law countries afford 
the parties the freedom to select their preferred system95, this selection is absolute; 
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there is no residual authority left to the tribunal to undertake additional investiga-
tions. It is uncertain whether parties can use Article 4.3 to exclude or replace this 
provision. 
This practice is consistent with the latent centralization that still pervades 
CIETAC’s approach to arbitration. It is also in alignment with the overarching im-
perative of achieving harmony through the litigation process and, in particular, the 
traditional deference that Chinese legal culture grants to superior authorities, such 
as arbitrators, to facilitate the restoration of this harmony.  
Among the benefits that this approach yields to participants is that it provides 
for an additional perspective in the dispute resolution process. In arbitrations 
where the cases put forth by the parties are largely equal in merit, the independent 
investigatory powers of the arbitrators can result in a more decisive resolution by 
identifying further relevant evidence. However, the powers of the arbitrators to 
pursue such evidence may be limited by jurisdictional constraints, such as their 
ability to exercise investigatory powers abroad. 
Article 41 also benefits the integrity of CIETAC by promoting the internal con-
sistency of decisions. The ability of arbitrators to initiate independent 
investigations provides the organizations with another avenue to ensure that deci-
sions conform with established procedure and precedent. It also serves to ensure 
the quality of CIETAC decisions by enabling arbitrators to base their decisions on 
the fullest possible body of evidence and law.  
However, Article 41 does bring certain disadvantages to the CIETAC process, 
principal among which is the uncertainty it causes in arbitrations. The ability of 
arbitrators to initiate independent investigations raises questions about the free-
dom of the parties to define the terms of the proceedings. Since the arbitrators 
likely retain this ability regardless of the terms of arbitration, their ability to deploy 
it is theoretically unrestricted. This undermines a key feature of arbitrations as be-
ing dispute resolution forums where the powers of the arbitrators are determined 
by the parties.96 By yielding more power to the arbitrators, Article 41 diminishes 
the autonomy of parties to determine the structure of the proceedings. It also 
makes the proceedings more susceptible to the biases of the arbitrators, particularly 
where the parties have selected an adversarial format. In that scenario, the expected 
role of the arbitrators as decision-makers is tempered by their secondary role as 
inquisitors. Without the procedural protections of an inquisitorial format, which 
anticipate this type of engagement, the parties may be ill-equipped to address evi-
dence introduced by the arbitrators.  
Conclusion 
CIETAC’s evolution as an institution has occurred at the confluence of an array 
of pressures exerted from both within and outside of the PRC. Yet it has not grown 
passively as an organization; it is a component of a broader matrix of tools that the 
Chinese state has at its disposal to facilitate economic reform. In response to these 
pressures, CIETAC has served to both reflect the predominant norms being pro-
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jected toward it by foreign and domestic sources, and as a vector for the introduc-
tion of new norms and practices into the global commercial arbitration 
architecture and into China’s developing legal system. Faced with this complex 
combination of influences, CIETAC has developed an approach to arbitration that 
hybridizes the generally accepted tenets of international commercial arbitration 
with mechanisms that ensure the appropriateness of the organization to its func-
tional and cultural context. Going forward, the success of CIETAC will be 
determined by how well it is able to sustain its continued internationalization and 
maintain its relevance to policymakers in Beijing. 
 
